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COMMENTS
DUTY OF CONDUCT OWED BY
PROPERTY OWNER TO TRESPASSER
I.

INTRODUCTION

This comment proposes to analyze the duty of care which a property
owner must observe with respect to trespassers on his property. Although the rules relating to this subject are usually announced in cases
having to do with acts of trespass upon land, they are equally applicable
where the trespass is upon personal property. In the main, the scope
of this inquiry is limited to the conduct of all property owners and does
not extend to conditions existing on land, the maintenance of which may
impose liability on a landowner. The rules of law applicable to cases of
trespasses upon land were formulated by a civilization dedicated to the
idea of private ownership and to a social policy which held that it was
just and wise that landowners should have the right to enjoy their land
without the burden of watching for and protecting those who enter
there without a claim of right.'
The common law writ of trespass, which included within its scope
offenses committed by a landowner upon his own premises, was originally a criminal writ.2 For a trespasser to have a cause of action in the

royal courts of England it was necessary that the act of the landowner
be accompanied by such a degree of culpability that it also amounted to
an offense against the Crown. Unless the injured trespasser could show
that the landowner's act involved criminality, he was denied relief. The
fact that trespass had its origin in criminal law has a dual significance.
First, it demonstrates the extent to which the law of feudal England
favored the landowner;3 second, it explains why, after the criminal
character of the writ of trespass disappeared, the landowner's civil
liability continued to be stated in terms which demanded the existence
of a substantially criminal state of mind.4
The duty which a property owner owes to a trespasser under modern
law becomes intelligible only when we understand that the modem law
evolved largely from cases involving a trespass upon land in a society
that stressed the landowner's right of use short of criminal conduct.
II. LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL AcTs
While their phraseology differs, most courts hold that no duty exists
toward a trespasser except that of refraining from injuring him either
1 PRossER, TORTS §77 (1941).
2 Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Entering His Premises of

Their Own Right, 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 237 (1921).
3 Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 L.Q. 32 (1937).
4 Bohlen, supra note 2, at 238.
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wilfully, wantonly or intentionally.5 The Wisconsin court has repeatedly
stated that "it has long been the established law of this state that a
person owes no duty to a trespasser except that of refraining from wil8
ful and intentional injury." 6
To warrant a finding of a willingness to inflict an injury:
"the danger of inflicting a personal injury upon a person by the
conduct of another must be such as to reasonably permit of a
belief that such other either contemplated producing it, or, being
conscious of the danger that it would occur, imposed that danger
upon such person in utter disregard of the consequences."T
In Wisconsin, conduct which manifests a willingness to inflict injury
is equivalent to gross negligence." The term "gross negligence," as it
is used in Wisconsin, is misleading because it has no reference to negligent conduct at all. While negligent conduct is characterized by inadvertence, gross negligence is characterized by the absence of inadvertence.
"Ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not the same. The
former lies in the field of inadvertence; the latter in the field of
an actual or constructive intent to injure."
So far as its legal consequences are concerned, it is equivalent to conduct that is "reckless, wilful, wanton and intentional."' 0
Although a landowner is entitled to the exclusive possession of his
land and may remove, with force if necessary, a trespasser, he will be
liable by virtue of the general rule in assault and battery if, in ejecting
a trespasser, he uses more than reasonable force.:" In Palmer v. Smith"
the question of whether or not a newly-wedded landowner was priviledged to shoot bullets at a group of trespassers who were conducting
a charivari party on his premises was before the court. In affirming a
judgment for the plaintiff who was a member of the charivari and who
was struck by a bullet fired by the defendant, the court approved the
following instruction:
5 See, e.g., Magar v. Hammond, 183 N.Y. 387, 390, 76 N.E. 474, 475 (1906) ("The
only obligation resting upon the defendants was to abstain from wilfully,
wantonly or recklessly injuring them.); O'Brien v. Union Freight Railroad
Co., 209 Mass. 449, 453, 95 N.E. 861, 862 (1911) ("As. to trespassers and
licensees the well settled rule is that the only duty of the owners or occupiers of the land is to abstain from inflicting intentional or wanton or wilful
injuries."); Hobert v. Collins, Lavery & Co., 80 N.J. Law 425, 78 Atl. 166
(1910) ; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Priest, 117 Ga. 767, 45 S.E. 35 (1903).
6 See, e.g., Routt v. Look, 180 Wis. 1, 191 N.W. 557 (1923) ; Frederick v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 207 Wis. 234, 241 N.W. 363 (1932); Hartman v. Badger
Tobacco Co., 210 Wis. 519, 246 N.W. 577 (1933); Nalepinski v. Durner, 259
7 Wis. 583, 49 N.W. 2d 601 (1951).
Bolin v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 108 Wis. 333, 84 N.W. 446 (1900).
8 Fox. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 147 Wis. 310, 133 N.W. 19 (1911).
9 Bentson v. Brown, 191 Wis. 460, 211 N.W. 132 (1926).
10 Austin v. Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry. Co., 143 Wis. 477, 484, 128 N.W. 265 (1910).
11 See 2. R.C.L. 557, 558.
12 147 Wis. 70, 132 N.W. 614 (1911).
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"A man may use reasonable and necessary force to eject a trespasser who intrudes upon his premises against his known commands but he cannot use wanton or unnecessary violence in so
doing or he becomes liable to respond in damages for any injury which he may thereby inflict."13
The general rule, requiring a property owner to refrain from wilfully or intentionally injuring a trespasser, has been invoked to restrict
the means available to a property owner for the protection of his
property. It is firmly established that a person cannot protect his property by means which are intended or calculated to destroy human life
or inflict serious or grievous bodily harm.14 Meibus v. Dodge 5 involved
a trespass on personal property. In that case, the plaintiff, while trespassing on the defendant's sleigh, was bitten by a ferocious dog who was
left to guard the sleigh. In holding the defendant liable for the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff, the court stated that an owner may not protect his property by "means endangering the life or safety of a human
being." 6 The cases, however, in which this rule has been most frequently enunciated are the so-called "Spring gun" cases. These concern trespassers who have been shot by a spring gun or who have fallen into a
mantrap which the landowner had set on his premises to protect his
property. In jurisdictions which have decided such cases the landowner
has been held to be liable.17 His liability is said to "arise from the fact
that the defendant

. . .

has expected the trespasser and prepared an in-

jury that is no more justified than if he had held the gun and fired it"18
and is based "upon the limitation which the law imposes upon the right
of the owner of property in rendering it protection."' 9 His liability, in
other words, is predicated upon the ground that his very act in setting a
spring gun or a mantrap indicates that he is expecting a trespasser and
intends to injure him.
While no spring gun case, as such, has arisen in Wisconsin, it would
be safe to conclude, in view of Meibus v. Dodge, that Wisconsin would
impose liability on the landowner in such a situation. The fact that a
ferocious dog was involved in that case would appear to be immaterial
since the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action is the defendant's intention to inflict injury and not the instrument by which his will is executed. 20 The owner's intent to inflict serious injury is manifested
'3

Ibid. at 75, 132 N.W. at 617.

'14Bohlen and Burns, The Privilege To Protect Property By Dangerous Barriers
and Mechanical Devices, 35
154; 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 369.

YALE

L. J. 525, 539 (1926).

See also 29 L.R.A.

15 38 Wis. 300 (1875).
16 Ibid. at 308.
17 Hooker v. Miller, 37 Iowa 613, 18 Am.Rep. 18 (1873); Riedel v. West Jersey
& S.R. Co., 177 F. 374, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 98, 21 Ann. Cas. 746 (1910) ; See also
note 14 supra.
Is United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 275, 42 S.Ct. 299 (1921).
19 Hooker v. Miller, supra note 17.
20 Zink v. Foss, 221 Mass. 73, 108 N.E. 906 (1915).
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whether he leaves a savage dog, a spring gun or a mantrap to protect
his property.-'
III. LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT AcTs
As the social value of human life came to be stressed by the courts,
dissatisfaction with the general rule, requiring property owners to refrain only from injuring trespassers wilfully or intentionally, became
apparent. The growing law of negligence urged that the property owner
be required to exercise ordinary care to protect trespassers; on the other
hand the landowners, pointing to their traditional immunities, insisted
that the imposition of such a duty would be unreasonable. 22 Most courts

tried to please all parties concerned by attempting to effect a compromise. In dealing with the problem, they have distinguished situations
in which the property owner is unaware of the trespasser's presence
from situations in which he has discovered the trespasser.
(1) Undiscovered Trespassers
The rule is well settled that a person has no duty to anticipate the
presence of trespassers. 23 An owner of property is entitled to assume
2
that persons will obey the law and not trespass upon his property. '
Because he is under no duty to anticipate trespassers, a property owner
is not bound to provide for their safety2 5 and a person who wrongfully
enters upon the land of another "takes his chances and must look out
for himself."2

6

Thus, a driver of a truck has no duty to provide for

the safety of persons who trespass on the truck without his knowledge
and is not liable for injuries sustained by such persons should they lose
their grip and fall under the wheels of the truck.2 7 Similarily, a railroad company is not bound to exercise any care or diligence to discover
trespassers on its tracks or to do any act or service in anticipation of
trespassers.28 In Nalepinski v. Durner,29 the plaintiff, standing on a
ladder in a driveway between the defendant's residence and an adjoining residence, fell when the defendant, unaware of his presence, backed
Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121, 131, 81 Am. Dec. 175, 181 (1862) ("A man
may not, in this country, use dangerous or unnecessary instruments for the
protection of his property against trespassers ... A dog is an instrument for
protection. A ferocious one is a dangerous instrument, and the keeping him on
the premises to protect them against trespassers is unlawful, upon the same
principle that setting spring guns, or concealed spears, or placing poisonous
food is unlawful.")
22 Bohlen, supra note 2, at 237.
23 Erie R.R. Co. v. Hilt, 247 U.S. 97, 38 S.Ct. 435 (1918); Upp v. Darner, 150
Iowa 403, 130 N.W. 409 (1911).
24 Supra, note 18.
25Erie R.R. Co. v. Hilt, supra note 23.
26
Dahi v. Valley Dredging Co., 125 Minn. 90, 145 N.W. 796 (1914).
2
7Routt v. Look, supra note 6.
28 Schug v. The Chicago, Milw. & St. P. R. Co., 102 Wis. 515, 78 N.W. 1090
(1899); Anderson v. C., St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 87 Wis. 195, 58 N.W. 79
(1894) ; Sorenson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 192 Wis. 231, 212 N.W. 273
(1927).
29 259 Wis. 583, 49 N.W. 2d 601 (1951).
21
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her automobile into the driveway and struck the ladder. It was held
that the allegation that the plaintiff was a trespasser on the defendant's
private property without the defendant's knowledge or consent constituted a good defense to a charge of negligence.
There is one recognized exception to the rule that a property owner
has no duty to anticipate trespassers. This exception applies where the
injured trespasser is a child who has been injured by instrumentalities
or artificial conditions which the property owner, in the exercise of
ordinary judgment and prudence, should know would naturally attract
children into unsuspected danger.3 0 Before a duty to anticipate trespassing children and to exercise reasonable care for their safety arises,
the following factors must be present :31
(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)

(e)

the instrumentality or artificial condition maintained or
allowed to exist by the property owner must be inherently
dangerous to children;
the property owner knew or should have known that children trespassed or were likely to trespass;
the property owner realized or should have realized that
the instrumentality or artificial condition was inherently
dangerous to children and involved an unreasonable risk of
serious bodily injury or death to them;
the injured child, because of his youth or tender age, did
not discover the instrumentality or artificial condition or
realize the risk involved in going within the area or in
playing in close proximity to the inherently dangerous instrumentality or artificial condition;
the property owner could reasonably have provided safeguards which would have obviated the inherent danger
without materially interfering with the purpose for which
the instrumentality or artificial condition was maintained.

In situations involving undiscovered trespassers, except in cases
where the "attractive nuisance" doctrine applies, the traditional immunity of property owners has been preserved because the only duty
that a property owner owes to them is merely to refrain from wilfully
or intentionally injuring them.
(2) Discovered Trespassers
While all courts are agreed that there is no duty to exercise ordinary
care to protect undiscovered trespassers, such unanimous accord has
not been reached in the case of discovered trespassers. The majority
3o

This exception is commonly referred to as the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.
The phrase is misleading because liability is based on the rules relating to negligence and not on those relating to the maintenance of a nuisance. See Fla-

mingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219, 55 N.W. 2d 24 (1952) (concurring
opinion).
31
Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 215 Wis. 47, 254 N.W. 351 (1934);
REsTATEMENT, Tom's §339.
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rule, often called the Michigan rule, holds property owners liable for
injuries negligently inflicted upon discovered trespassers. "Where a
trespasser is discovered upon the premises by the owner or occupant,
he is not beyond the pale of the law, and any negligence resulting in
injury will render the person guilty of negligence liable to respond in
damages. 13 2 Once the trespasser is discovered, the property owner must
exercise ordinary care for his safety. The minority rule, called the
Massachusetts rule, states that the only duty of the owner is to refrain
33
from wilfully or intentionally injuring the seen trespasser.
Wisconsin has followed the Michigan rule in setting forth the duty
of care which a railroad owes to trespassers on its tracks:
"The use of a railroad is exclusively for its owner or those acting
under its authority, and the company is not bound to the exercise
of any active duty of care or diligence towards mere trespassers
on its track, to keep a look-out to discover or protect them from
injury, except, that, when discovered in a position of danger or
peril, it is its duty to use all reasonable and proper effort to save
and protect them from the probable consequences of their indiscretion or negligence." 34
The court later remarks:
"But after discovery that a party is on its track and in a position
of danger, it is bound to the exercise of reasonable and appropriate care to prevent his injury, even though wrongfully on its
track." 5
Another situation in which Wisconsin has applied the Michigan rule
is where the trespass is upon vehicles. In this situation, the plaintiff is
generally a child who has climbed onto a railroad car3" or a truck37 and
loses his grip when the vehicle is set into motion. If the presence of the
trespassers was unknown to the defendant the plaintiff is denied recovery because the only duty owed to him is that "of refraining from
wilful and intentional injury." If, on the other hand, the defendant had
knowledge of his presence, he is under a duty to protect him from
injury.3
32

33

Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384, 81 N.W. 333 (1899). For an exhaustive collection of authorities see 45 C.J. 749 note 34. See also, RESTATEmENT, To'rs
§336 (adopts the Michigan rule).
See, Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers,27 HIv. L. REv. 403 (The author pre-

sents compelling arguments in favor of the Michigan rule).
v. C., St. ., M. & 0. R. Co., supra note 28 at 204, 58 N.W. at 82.
35 Ibid.; See also Sorenson v. C. M. & St. P. R. Co., supra note 28; Sheehan v.
St. P. & D. Ry. Co., 76 Fed. 201 (1896), in which the court said that "an obligation to exercise reasonable effort to avert injury to trespassers arises at
the moment of discovery."
36 Wendorf v. Director General of Railroads, 173 Wis. 53, 180 N.W. 128 (1920).
37
Routt v. Look, supra note 6.
38 Wendorf v. Director General of Railroads, supra note 36 at 55, 180 N.W. at
129 ("The railroad company owed them no active duty to protect them unless
its agents and servants had knowledge of their presence on the train and of
their perilous position") ; Routt v. Look, supra note 6 at 11, 191 N.W. at 561
34 Anderson
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In other situations the Wisconsin court has vacillated between the
Michigan and the Massachusetts rule. It has failed to draw the distinction between seen and unseen trespassers and at times has said that no
duty exists toward a trespasser except to refrain from wilfully or intentionally injuring him,3 9 while at other times it has said that the
property owner is under an additional duty to refrain from "active
negligence committed at the time of injury. ' 40 The latest pronouncement
on this subject is the case of Deaton v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp.4"
In that case, the plaintiff was an employee of an independent contractor
who was hired by the defendant to lay sewer pipes on the defendant's
property in trenches to be dug by the defendant with one of its own
power shovels. The plaintiff, his own work being slack, went over to the
power shovel and by means of his hands guided the bucket as it was
lowered into the trench and was injured when the bucket struck him.
The crane operator and works manager testified that the plaintiff had
been warned to stay away from the power shovel and not to put his
hands on the bucket. The plaintiff denied that he had received such
warning. No question was submitted in the special verdict as to
whether plaintiff was a trespasser as to the power shovel at the time he
placed his hands on the bucket. In remanding the case for a new trial
the court said:
"If the plaintiff should be determined to have been a trespasser
at the time and place of the accident, then he cannot recover,
because the only duty defendant's crane operator would have
owed to plaintiff would have been
42 to have refrained from wilfully or wantonly injuring him."
The only authority cited by the court in support of this statement is
Nalepinski v. Durner. That case, however, is plainly distinguishable on
its facts in that it involved an injury to an unseen trespasser.
It has been suggested that a distinction should be drawn as to the
status of the person against whom liability is asserted. 43 In the Deaton
("The duty of a driver to look out for the safety of a child does not arise

unless and until he is advised or knows or ought to know that the child is in
a perilous position.").

39 Bolin v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., supra note 7; Nalepinski v. Durner,
supra note 6.
40 Frederick v. Great Northern Ry Co., supra note 6; Zartner v. George, 156 Wis.
131, 145 N.W. 129 (1914) (overruled in Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., supra note 31 on other grounds).
4' 265 Wis. 349, 61 N.W. 2d 552 (1953).
42 Ibid. at 353, 61 N.W. 2d at 554; Compare the Deaton case with Walsh v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 221 Pa. 463, 70 Atl. 826 (1908), in which the court said, "If
the man who started the motor . . . from his knowledge of the circumstances
was conscious that she would be exposed to danger if the machinery was put
in motion, a duty of care arose, as it would in the case of an engineer who sees
a child on the track in front of his engine."
43 See Stefan v. New Process Laundry, 323 Pa. 373, 377, 185 Atl. 734, 736 (1936),
where the distinction as to the status of the person sought to be held liable was
expressly recognized.
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case, the plaintiff was attempting to hold liable not the person whose
negligence caused its injury but his employer. The problem of the extent to which vicarious liability should be imposed upon an absent
master for the negligence of his servant was, therefore, involved. 4 As
to the employer, the plaintiff was, in fact, an unseen trespasser. If the
plaintiff had attempted to hold the crane operator liable, perhaps the
court would have been inclined to have followed the rule enunciated
in Zartner v. George45 which would impose liability on the defendant
for active negligence committed at the time of the injury.
Until the time arrives that Wisconsin sees fit to adopt the modem
view (IV, infra), it is suggested that the distinction between seen and
unseen trespassers which the Wisconsin court has drawn in the railroad cases be applied in all cases wherein a trespasser seeks recovery
against a property owner. If this distinction were applied the present
uncertainty in this area of the law would be eliminated and a property
owner would owe to a discovered trespasser only that duty which he
already owes to every other human being. At the same time, Wisconsin
law would be brought into harmony with that of the overwhelming
majority of the states.
IV. A MODERN VIEW
The compromise of the majority of the courts which holds that a
property owner's liability for negligently injuring a trespasser depends on whether or not the trespasser was discovered by him is certainly a laudable one in that it attempts to mitigate the harshness of the
general rule which holds that a property owner is liable to trespassers
only for wilful and intentional injury.
A modem view, however, has questioned the validity of making a
property owner's liability depend upon whether the trespasser is seen
or unseen.46 It points out that the basis of a defendant's liability should
be his conduct and not the status of the person injured. The reason
that is given for denying relief to an unseen trespasser is not that a
trespass is a wrongful act but that his presence is not to be anticipated
and therefore no duty rests upon the property owner to provide for his
safety. This is purely a legal fiction because, in fact, his presence can
be, and often is, anticipated. Take the case of an unseen trespasser
who has been injured by a spring gun or a mantrap set by the landowner. The reason why the landowner has been held liable is because
44The same problem was present in Hartmann v. Badger Tobacco Co., supra
note 6. (Defendant's employee, in disregard of the defendant's directions not
to permit other persons to ride on the truck, took his sister for a ride. She
was killed when the truck capsized. In an action by the deceased's parents
the court refused to impose liability on the defendant-employer.)
45 Supra, note 40.
46 Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf & W. Co., 4 Cal. 2d 499, 501, 502, 503, 50 P. 2d
803 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, ToRrs §336.
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he has, in fact, anticipated the "unseen" trespasser.47 His liability is
predicated on his conduct and not on the status of the trespasser.
The modern view simply broadens the rationale of the "Spring gun"
cases by applying it to all cases where a trespasser can, in fact, be
anticipated. It has the effect of expanding the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine to include adults as well as children. It submits that, in all
cases, the true test of a property owner's liability is whether he has
acted as a reasonably prudent man would act in view of the probability
that his conduct may result in injuries to others. 48 It should be noted
that this doctrine would almost entirely deprive a landowner of his
traditional immunities since he would be liable to even unseen trespassers if, at the time he acted, he had reason to expect that trespassers
would be present within the range of his negligent acts.
DAVID KAISER

47 United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, supra note 18.
48 Supra, note 46.

